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I. Introduction
The international financial crises had a tremendous impact within Europe but 
particularly on the southern European countries. Portugal itself  was severely affected. 
With the financial crises came the bankruptcy of  private Banks and companies, and, 
of  course, with bankruptcy, many cases of  insider dealing, market abuse and overall 
corruption were made public. This situation reignited the debate on the need for more 
severe legislation and penalties.
Due to the Framework Decisions and Directives adopted (both before and after 
the entry into force of  the Treaty of  Lisbon in 2009) we have witnessed an “europeization” 
of  criminal law, beyond the initial need to protect Europe’s financial interests and aimed 
more towards the development of  a solid, cohesive European criminal law. 
The ongoing historical context shows the need to consolidate the illegal nature 
of  insider dealing – as well as other phenomena connected with economic activities. 
This particular context also shows that market globalization justifies the need for the 
harmonization of  legal instruments. The reason for the criminalization of  situations 
characterized as market abuse, includes the need to ensure the integrity of  financial 
markets and to promote investors’ confidence in it, forbidding practices which 
cast doubt on integrity, resulting in an increase in investment, and the consequent 
improvement of  the European economy.  The necessity of  criminalizing insider dealing 
arises from the need to prevent opportunistic behaviour based on the dissemination of  
asymmetric information.
The conditions for the smooth functioning of  the securities markets should be 
preserved for several reasons: because they are channelled to market the savings of  
investors, both for a relationship between the visibility of  the issuer and for the interest 
generated by the trading of  assets in the market; because the negotiation, in itself, 
generates information for investors in terms of  quantities, prices and market trends; 
and also because the prices that are generated in a regulated market are public price 
references used in numerous public and private decisions. If  negotiations take place 
for the free balancing of  supply and demand, the market trends which they form are 
real. Otherwise they may be artificial and misleading for the various economic actors 
and public authorities. 
II. Approximation of  substantive Criminal Law 
To a certain extent, the European Union’s founding fathers overlooked the 
importance of  the enforcement of  Community law. This led to the enforcement of  
several policies in favour of  the autonomy and discretion of  Member States – namely 
regarding the agricultural and fisheries policy, Community customs code, European 
financial services regulations, EU subsidy fraud rules, European environmental policy 
and European rules on corporate law.
The European Commission soon became aware of  the enforcement gap in the 
Treaties, and accordingly, in 1976, the Commission made an attempt to complement 
the Treaties with protocols concerning fraud and corruption by Community officials. 
Despite these efforts, neither protocol gained the political approval of  the Council. 
With the support of  the European Parliament, the Commission was already then 
of  the opinion that there was a considerable enforcement deficit on the part of  
Member States when it came to compliance with European policies. Therefore, the 
Commission submitted several concrete legislative proposals to the Council aiming 
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at obliging Member States to use both punitive administrative law and criminal law in 
the enforcement of  Community law. Many of  these proposals were approved by the 
Council, obliging Member States to impose punitive administrative sanctions, especially 
in the area of  common agricultural policy. 
This emerging influence of  EU law on the law of  punitive sanctions was not 
applauded by all Member States. In 1990, Germany brought an action for annulment 
of  Regulation (EEC) nº. 3007/84, from 26 October 1984,1 and Regulation (ECC) nº, 
1260/90, from 11 May 1990,2 both concerning agricultural policy, before the Court of  
Justice. The Regulations not only prescribed restitution (with a surcharge) of  subsidies 
that had been unjustifiably obtained, but also punitive exclusion from subsidy schemes. 
Germany was of  the opinion that the European Community did not have the power 
to prescribe punitive sanctions. In 1992, in a landmark decision, the Court of  Justice 
ruled that the European Community was competent to adopt the measures, including 
the punitive sanctions.3
Work on approximating substantive criminal law began within the European 
Union under the third pillar of  the Treaty of  Maastricht. Examples of  this are the 
1995 Convention on the protection of  the European Community’s financial interests,4 
the 1997 Convention on the fight against corruption,5 or the different joint actions 
adopted at the time in the field of  participation in a criminal organization,6 trafficking 
in human beings7 and other subjects.
Work was also pursued under the Treaties of  Amsterdam and Nice. Within this 
framework, and mainly on the basis of  article 31 (e) of  the Treaty on the European 
Union (“TEU”), a substantial number of  initiatives in the field of  approximation of  
substantive criminal law were put forward. Framework decisions were adopted in the 
fields of  terrorism,8 trafficking in human beings,9 sexual exploitation of  children and 
child pornography,10 smuggling of  human beings,11 counterfeiting of  euros,12 fraud 
1 OJ, L, nº. 283, p. 28; EE 03 F32 p. 161. 
2 OJ, L, nº. 124, p. 15. 
3 Case 240/90, from 27 October 1992, Germany v. Council and Commission, ECR, p. I-5383. 
4 Convention of  26 July 1995 on the protection of  the EC’s Financial Interests (OJ, nº. C 316, 27 
November 1995, p. 49 f). 
5 Convention of  26 May 1997 on the fight against corruption involving officials of  the EC or officials 
of  Member States of  the EU (OJ, nº.  C 195, 25 June 1997, p. 2). 
6 Joint Action of  21 December 1998 on making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal 
organization in the Member States of  the EU (OJ, nº. L 351, 29 December 1998, p. 1 f).  
7 Joint Action of  24 February 1997 concerning action to combat trafficking in human beings and 
sexual exploitation of  children (OJ, nº. L 63, 4 March 1997, p. 2 f). 
8 Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of  13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (OJ nº. L 164, 22 June 
2002, p. 2 f) and Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of  28 November 2008 amending Framework 
Decision 2002/475/JHA (OJ, nº. L 330, 9 December 2008, p. 2 f). 
9 Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA of  19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings (OJ, 
nº. L 203, 1 August 2002, p. 1 f). 
10 Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA of  22 December 2003 on combating sexual exploitation of  
children and child pornography (OJ, nº. L 13, 20 January 2004, p. 44 f). 
11 Framework Directive of  28 November 2002 on the strengthening of  the penal framework to prevent 
the facilitation of  unauthorised entry, transit and residence (OJ, nº. L 328, 5 December 2002, p. 1 f). 
12 Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA of  29 May 2000 on increasing protection by criminal penalties 
and other sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the introduction of  the euro (OJ, nº. L 
149, 14 June 2000; Framework Decision 2001/888/JHA of  6 December 2001 amending Framework 
Decision 2000/383/JHA (OJ, nº. L 329, 14 December 2001). 
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and counterfeiting of  non-cash payments,13 corruption,14 drug trafficking,15 racism and 
xenophobia,16 cybercrime,17 among others. Some of  these acts were second generation 
instruments which simply replaced previous joint actions. 
The Treaty of  Lisbon provides for a new legal framework for criminal legislation 
and for the punishing of  crimes committed within the area of  freedom, security and 
justice. This Treaty changed the substance of  criminal law harmonisation, the applicable 
rules and the objective of  harmonisation.18 
The first reference to approximation is made in article 67 (3) of  the Treaty on 
the Functioning of  the European Union (“TFEU”).19 In this article, approximation is 
referred to as one of  the measures that can be used to ensure a high level of  security. 
However, approximation appears in this article after coordination and cooperation 
measures and after mutual recognition. To finish, the European legislator states that 
the use of  approximation should only occur “if  necessary”, which reflects the delicacy 
of  this topic. 
Article 67 (3) of  the TFEU consecrates not only the principle of  mutual 
recognition of  judicial and extrajudicial decisions and the right of  access to justice 
which are essential elements for the functioning of  the internal market as well as 
European citizenship in the dimension of  freedom of  movement.
We must also note that article 67 (1) of  the TFEU, binds the development of  the 
area of  freedom, security and justice to the “respect for fundamental rights and the different 
legal systems and traditions of  the Member States”. 
The approximation of  substantive criminal legislation is of  paramount importance, 
as it aims at enhancing the fight against criminality and preventing criminals from 
benefiting from the existing disparities between Member States’ criminal laws. On the 
other hand, it also ensures the development and exercise of  free movement of  persons 
within the EU, it reinforces the notion of  European citizenship and provides citizens 
with a common sense of  justice throughout the Union which creates a feeling of  
belonging to a common area.
The adoption of  the Treaty of  Lisbon established a new legal basis for the 
adoption of  legal instruments for criminal procedural law – article 82 of  the TFEU – 
and for substantive criminal law – article 83 of  the TFEU. Prevention and punishment 
of  criminality in the European Union has become an objective related not only to the 
13 Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA of  29 May 2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting of  non-
cash means of  payment (OJ, nº. L 149, 2 June 2001). 
14 Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of  22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector 
(OJ, nº. L 192, 31 July 2003). 
15 Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA of  25 October 2004 laying down minimum provisions on the 
constituent elements of  criminal acts and penalties in the field of  illicit drug trafficking (OJ, nº. L 335, 
11 November 2004). 
16 Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on combating certain forms and expression of  racism and 
xenophobia by means of  criminal law (OJ, nº. 328, 6 December 2008). 
17 Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of  24 February 2005 on attacks against information systems 
(OJ, nº. L 69, 16 March 2005). 
18 Article 3 of  the Treaty of  the European Union states that “The Union shall offer its citizens an area 
of  freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of  persons is 
ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, 
immigration and the prevention and combating crime”.  
19 About the interpretation of  article 67 read António Vitorino, “Artigo 67”, Tratado de Lisboa Anotado 
e Comentado, ed. Manuel Lopes Porto and Gonçalo Anastácio (Coimbra: Almedina Editora, 2012) 
371-373. 
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free movement of  persons, but also to citizens’ rights and duties. 
According to the wording of  article 82 of  the TFEU, harmonisation of  procedural 
and substantive criminal law is a necessary tool for strengthening judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters based on mutual recognition and mutual trust. Considering the 
scope of  this study, we will focus only on the provisions of  article 83. 
Under article 83 (1) of  the TFEU,20 the European Parliament and the Council are 
competent to adopt directives in the areas of  particularly serious crimes with cross-
border dimensions resulting from the nature or impact of  such offences or from a 
special need to combat them on a common basis. Article 83 (1) of  the TFEU allows 
for the development of  approximation independently of  any other ongoing EU work. 
This article establishes a list of  ten serious areas of  criminal activity with cross-border 
dimensions for which the EU holds a legislative competence, the so-called “euro-
crimes”.21 
Article 83 (2) of  the TFEU provides for the so-called “annex-competence”.22 In 
this article, the EU’s competence is enlarged if  the approximation of  criminal laws 
and regulations of  the Member States proves essential for ensuring the effective 
implementation of  a Union Policy in an area which has been subject to harmonisation 
measures guaranteeing their “effet utile”. This provision allows for the extension or 
diversification of  the areas in which approximation is carried out and most likely opens 
the door to a very broad criminal law competence.23 
Article 83 (3) of  the TFEU provides a so-called “emergency break”. When a Member 
State considers that a draft directive would affect fundamental aspects of  its criminal 
justice system, the ordinary legislative procedure is suspended and the proposal is 
referred to the European Council. If, within four months, unanimity is reached, the 
draft is referred back to the Council and the suspension is lifted. If  an agreement is not 
reached in the European Council, a group of  at least nine Member States can establish 
enhanced cooperation.
The legal basis for the adoption of  the MAD is article 83 (2) of  the TFEU - this 
was in fact the first Directive adopted under said article. This Directive is part of  a 
legislative double text package, which also includes a Regulation on insider dealing 
and market manipulation (Regulation (EU) nº. 596/2014 of  the European Parliament 
and the Council, from 16 April 2014). The prevention and effective punishment of  
market abuse can only be achieved through the integration of  EU and national criminal 
policies.24 
20 About the interpretation of  article 83 see Anabela Miranda Rodrigues, “Artigo 83”, Tratado de Lisboa 
Anotado e Comentado, ed. Manuel Lopes Porto and Gonçalo Anastácio (Coimbra: Almedina Editora, 
2012) 434-438. 
21 Terrorism, trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation of  women and children, illicit drug 
trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of  means of  payment, 
computer crime and organised crime. 
22 Anne Weyembergh (in collaboration with Serge de Biolley), “Approximation of  substantive criminal 
law: The new institutional and decision-making framework and new types of  interaction between EU 
actors”, Approximation of  substantive criminal law in the EU: The way forward, ed. Francesca Galli and Anne 
Weyembergh (Brussels: IEE, 2013), 16. 
23 Anne Weyembergh (in collaboration with Serge de Biolley), “Approximation of  substantive criminal 
law…”, 17. 
24 John A. E. Varvaele, “Harmonised Union policies and the harmonisation of  substantive criminal 
law”, in Approximation of  substantive criminal law in the EU: The way forward, ed. Francesca Galli and Anne 
Weyembergh (Brussels: IEE, 2013), 69. 
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III. The Portuguese legal order 
European Directive 89/592/EEC, of  13 November 1989,25 coordinating 
regulations on insider dealing, imposed the approximation of  Member States’ 
legislations on the subject. This Directive identified insider dealing as a factor capable 
of  jeopardizing the markets’ functioning. This Directive underlined the fundamental 
role of  the “secondary market in transferable securities in the financing of  economic agents”26 
and highlighted the close connections between the markets’ proper functioning 
and investor confidence. In order to preserve these assets – the proper functioning 
of  the market and investor confidence – the Directive imposed the prohibition on 
certain behaviours, but article 13 allowed Member States to decide on the penalties 
to be applied for infringement of  the measures taken pursuant to it. This Directive 
was transposed into the Portuguese Legal order, however, the illegal nature of  insider 
dealing and a concept of  market manipulation had already been established in the 
Code of  Commercial Companies (Código das Sociedades Comerciais) which had entered 
into force in 1986,27 even before the adoption of  Directive 89/592/EC.
The Code of  Commercial Companies established the illegal nature of  insider 
dealing and contemplated non-penal sanctions – the obligation to compensate the 
injured, judicial dismissal of  the responsible agents and judicial investigation (articles 
449 and 450 of  the Code of  Commercial Companies).
Later on, in 1987, the Code was amended28 and a title on penal and administrative 
offences was introduced, including the crimes of  insider dealing in article 524, and 
fraudulent manipulation of  the market in article 525. The explanation for this event is 
laid down in the preamble to the Decree-Law which approved this amendment stating 
that “we attempted to preserve within these offenses, without direct correspondence in the Penal Code, in 
addition to the essential language of  precision, a global connection to the structure of  the classic offenses, 
so that the work of  jurisprudence still finds plenty of  guidance and support in the system of  concepts 
and principles of  criminal law. It must be noted that these provisions, as with other similar rebound in 
corporate life, start from a pedagogical intent: they aim to contribute to the consolidation of  economic 
rules and correct habits and business’ ethics”.29 After unveiling the focus on company ethics, it 
is not surprising that the crime of  insider dealing, in the Portuguese legal order, begins 
by being established in the Code of  Commercial Companies and by targeting firstly the 
members of  the administration and the auditory bodies of  limited liability companies 
(sociedades anónimas), or those who illegally reveal information obtained through the 
service provided to the company to a third party (information which had not been 
disclosed before).
The reorganization of  the Portuguese securities market which was undertaken 
in 1991 was organized from a long list of  administrative offences and only three 
crimes were included: market manipulation, insider dealing and disobedience, the first 
two revoked the equivalent crimes of  the former Code of  Commercial Companies 
from 1987.30 This modification to the legal framework is very important because it 
25 Council Directive 89/592/EEC of  13 November 1989 coordinating regulations on insider dealing, 
OJ L 334, 18.11.1989, 30–32. 
26 Recitals of  the Council Directive 89/592/CEE, from 13 November 1989, coordinating regulations 
on insider dealing. 
27 Decreto-Lei n.º 262/86, de 02/09, available at www.pgdl.pt. 
28 Decreto-lei 262/86, de 2 de Setembro, available at www.pgdl.pt.  
29 Decreto-lei 262/86, de 2 de Setembro, available at www.pgdl.pt. 
30 Comissão de Mercado de Valores Mobiliários, Contra-Ordenações e Crimes no Mercado de Valores 
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demonstrates the connection between insider dealing and the securities market.31 The 
model adopted in 1991 remains effective until today. 
This dualistic legal structure – establishing administrative sanctions and crimes 
– allowed a clear separation between contraventions of  duties whose compliance is 
revealed necessary to ensure the fair and proper functioning of  the market, and facts 
with the more severe and inexcusable capacity of  injuring, which causes damage to the 
legal interests essential to the organization, structure and functioning of  this sector 
of  the financial system, and which deserve criminal protection afforded by being 
considered as crimes against the market.32 
Generally, the administrative offences against the market correspond to illegalities 
of  a professional character or dangerous, dysfunctional or harmful market activities. 
These illegalities may constitute a violation of  the Portuguese Code of  Securities, as 
well as other national or European specific legislation. 
Different sanctions correspond to this dichotomy of  infractions, which are applied 
by different authorities – the administrative sanctions are applied by CMVM (Comissão 
de Mercado de Valores Mobiliários, the Portuguese Securities Market Commission); for 
crimes against the market, the Portuguese judicial authorities have exclusive competence 
(however, CMVM is competent to carry out preliminary inquiries which may turn out 
to be the grounds for a reasoned criminal investigation). 
The administrative offenses are unlawful acts resulting in financial penalties 
(fines) and sanctions (e.g. temporary prohibition of  a certain activity), and also the 
added specific legal consequences such as loss of  economic benefits obtained from 
the illegal behaviour. On the other hand, criminal acts are punishable with penalties 
including imprisonment and fines, accompanied by accessory penalties provided for 
in the Portuguese Securities Code (temporary professional ban and publication of  the 
judgment) and loss of  economic benefits obtained from the crime committed as a legal 
consequence thereof. 
The administrative penalties established in the Portuguese Securities Code 
(CdVM)33 impose responsibilities on the agents if  their conduct was intentional or 
negligent, but, crimes against the market are only considered as such if  they were 
intentional.
With the adoption of  this model, the legislator was able to effectively articulate 
three different levels of  supervision: a permanent administrative action monitoring the 
activity of  agents and operations in the market; an immediate punitive punishment, 
which was to act as a deterrent and extended to all market segments of  activity (through 
administrative offenses); and an ultima ratio option, limited to the most serious cases 
representing the functional denial of  the market.
Nowadays, within the Portuguese Legal Order, the crimes of  insider dealing and 
Mobiliários, July 2009, available at http://www.cmvm.pt/pt/EstatisticasEstudosEPublicacoes/
Estudos/EmArquivo/Documents/ContraOrdenacoeseCrimes199120091.pdf. 
31 José de Faria Costa, O Crime de Abuso de Informação Privilegiada (insider trading) a informação enquanto 
problema jurídico-penal, (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 2006) 28. 
32 Comissão de Mercado de Valores Mobiliários, Contra-Ordenações e Crimes no Mercado de Valores 
Mobiliários, July 2009, available at http://www.cmvm.pt/pt/EstatisticasEstudosEPublicacoes/
Estudos/EmArquivo/Documents/ContraOrdenacoeseCrimes199120091.pdf. 
33 Código dos Valores Mobiliários – Decreto Lei n.º 486/99 de 13 de Novembro, available at http://
www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?nid=450&tabela=leis&so_miolo=& (access: 
October 1st 2017). 
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market manipulation are established in the Securities Code.34 The Portuguese Securities 
Code was published in 1999, it grouped the crimes of  insider dealing and market 
manipulation in a section dedicated to “crimes against the market”. Furthermore, in 2005, 
a law which authorizes the Government to legislate on crimes of  insider dealing and 
market manipulation was published, establishing the conditions for the transposition 
of  Directive 2003/6/CE of  the European Parliament and the Council, of  28 January 
2003, on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse).35 The Directive 
from 2003 established a general “framework of  principles”36 on tackling the crimes of  
insider dealing and market manipulation.37 
The Portuguese Securities Code currently in force considers insider dealing and 
market manipulation as crimes against the market. Therefore, in order to protect the 
market, we must protect information.
Portuguese legislation was adopted in order to transpose, into national law, the 
Directive under scrutiny – it was dealt with under national Law nº. 28/2017, of  30 of  
May. However, main changes concern making the national legislation’s adaptation to 
Regulation 596/2014 clear and not, in a specific and biding way, transposing Directive 
2014/57/UE.  
IV. The previous regime
a) Insider Dealing
Securities markets rely on information that is essential for decisions by investors, 
companies and regulators. The origin, nature and function of  some of  this information 
is at times reserved to a limited circle of  people, becoming accessible to the general 
public at a later stage. The time of  disclosure and quality of  information to be disclosed, 
among other things, affect and influence the agents’ decisions in the market and have a 
significant impact on the formation of  prices.
Portuguese law prohibits the transmission and improper use of  such information 
if  it has not been made public. Before that, its use is restricted or even prohibited. 
Furthermore, we must ensure access to information by the majority of  investors in 
conditions of  equality, using the time the information was made public as a reference. 
The transmission or improper use of  inside information before it has been made 
public may jeopardize the proper functioning of  the market, it may frustrate ongoing 
operations and generate illegitimate advantages for some investors at the expense 
of  others. So the law considers that such facts constitute a crime when committed 
intentionally by individuals.
By banning these acts, criminal law aims to strengthen investor confidence in 
the functioning of  the securities markets, regulating the conditions of  the relevant 
information and the possibility of  negotiating its use. The definition of  insider 
dealing was laid down in article 378 (3) of  the CdVM (Portuguese Securities Code) as: 
“information which has not been made public, being precise and relating directly or indirectly to any 
issuer or any securities or other financial instruments would be likely if  it were made public, to have a 
34 Idem. 
35 Guido A. Ferrarini, “The European Market Abuse Directive”, Common Market Law Review 41 (2004): 
711-741.  
36 José de Brito Nunes, “Notas pessoais sobre o processo Lamfalussy”, Cadernos do Mercado de Valores 
Mobiliários 18 (2004): 48. 
37 Helena Bolina, “A manipulação de mercado e o abuso de informação privilegiada na nova Directiva sobre abuso 
de mercado (2003/6/CE)”, Cadernos do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários 18 (2004): 62.
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significant effect on the market”.
For the adoption of  the concept of  inside information in Portuguese law it was 
also relevant to analyse article 248 (2) of  the CdVM, which explained the scope of  
some elements of  the concept in more detail: “inside information includes the facts 
that occurred, existing or are reasonably foreseeable, regardless of  their degree of  
formalization, which, because they are likely to influence the pricing of  the securities 
or financial instruments, any reasonable investor would normally use if  had known 
them in order to base all or part of  their investment decisions”.
The legal concept (article 378 (4) of  the CdVM) required that, for the relevant 
information to be considered privileged, it must contain four characteristics: information 
which is (1) non-public, (2) specific, (3) accurate (precise) and (4) likely to have a 
significant price effect if  it were made public. These four aspects of  inside information 
have been detailed by doctrine, case law, but also by regulators of  the various countries 
and international bodies, such as the Committee of  European Securities Regulators 
(CESR).38 The information is not public when it has not been made accessible to most 
investors, and it is specific when it comes, directly or indirectly, to any issuer or the 
securities or financial instruments. 
The other two requirements of  this legal concept – its precise nature and price 
sensitive information – were achieved in article 248 (2) of  the CdVM which was 
expanded upon in the second round of  CESR’s advice on this matter.39 Hereunder, 
some aspects relevant to the assessment of  these essential conditions for qualification 
as privileged information are set out.
The information must be of  a precise nature. The determination that we are 
facing a fact which has already occurred, is existing or which is reasonably foreseeable 
to occur characterizes the precise nature of  the information, thus distinguishing it from 
mere rumour or speculation.
For the information to be accurate, there is no need for it to be complete or 
permanent, if  the information relates to a process which takes place over several stages 
(as is the case in the preparation of  a public offer of  acquisition – OPA), not only the 
entire process taken as a whole, but also each separate phase can be considered accurate 
information. The fact that the process will not be completed does not exclude the 
information on the occurrence of  a stage of  the process from being considered accurate.
This guidance from CESR corresponds to the understanding that has been 
followed by the Portuguese courts (Criminal Courts and Courts of  Appeal)40 in 
applying the concept of  inside information in phased business processes (such as the 
preparation of  a friendly takeover bid), assigning independent status to each step of  
the decision making process, contact and negotiations between the parties (considering 
each set of  facts in itself  as inside information), and not limited to the end result of  it 
or the pricing to offer. Knowing these facts in any stage prior to the final outcome of  
the business gives the insider an advantage before other investors, an advantage which 
the insider cannot legitimately use. The information is accurate when it has a degree of  
38 Luigi Foffani, “Nuevas Tendencias Y Perspectivas del Derecho Penal Economico Europeo”, Revista 
Portuguesa de Ciência Criminal 24/ 2 (2014): 225-234; Comissão de Mercado de Valores 
Mobiliários, Contra-Ordenações e Crimes no Mercado de Valores Mobiliários, July 2009, available 
at http://www.cmvm.pt/pt/EstatisticasEstudosEPublicacoes/Estudos/EmArquivo/Documents/
ContraOrdenacoeseCrimes199120091.pdf. 
39 Report of  the Committee of  European Securities Regulators CESR/06-562 b, July 2007, available 
at https://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/06_562b.pdf. 
40 Porto Court of  Appeal, Judgment from 31/05/2012, available at www.dgsi.pt. 
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significance which allows it to be used. 
In the formulation of  the law, this happens when the information allows us to 
draw a conclusion about its possible impact on prices, consequently allowing us to 
make an investment decision involving a very low financial risk.
The information has yet to be suitable to significantly change the price (price 
sensitive information). The susceptibility of  the information to influence the price 
should be assessed ex ante, which means it must take into account the degree to which 
it would be expected that this information had, or would have had, an effect on market 
prices, if  it had been disclosed at the time the fact occurred or before the information 
was made public. The suitability of  the information is evaluated through a hypothetical 
reasoning: if  the fact was known by the market at that time, would this have produced 
a significant change on asset prices?
The criterion for determining this susceptibility in done to the standard of  a 
reasonable investor: in relation to price sensitive information, the information which 
any reasonable investor might normally use, if  he had had access to it, on which to base 
all or part of  his investment decisions.
To be able to characterize this susceptibility of  influencing prices, we must, in 
particular, take into account the following factors: the predicted magnitude of  the act 
in question in the context of  the business; the relevance of  the information to the main 
determinants of  the price of  the financial instrument; the credibility of  the source; and 
the market variables that influence the price of  the financial instrument.41
There are several examples of  indicators that the information is likely to have an 
impact on the financial instrument’s price: the type of  information concerned is the 
same information that in the past, had an impact on prices; the type of  information in 
question is normally taken into account as a factor for investment recommendations to 
take into consideration (e.g. to determine the price target); the information was expressly 
kept secret; and the issuer treated similar events in the past as inside information.
In addition to the general prohibition on the misuse of  inside information set 
out in article 248 (4) of  the CdVM, the incriminating types of  insider dealing set out 
in article 378 describe a set of  criminally prohibited behaviours. Therefore, the person 
who is in possession of  inside information may not: transmit such information outside 
the normal scope of  their duties; nor may they use this information, which means they 
cannot negotiate, advise someone to negotiate, sort, for themselves or others, directly 
or indirectly, the subscription, purchase, sale or exchange of  securities.
The crime of  insider dealing is imputable only to individuals and only if  the 
behaviour was intentional. When, legal persons or individuals acting merely negligently 
are involved, they may be faced with the prescribed administrative offense provided in 
article 248 (4) of  the CdVM, for the misuse of  inside information. Legal persons may 
also be sued in criminal proceedings as civil parties for the purposes of  article 378 (7) 
of  the CdVM.
b) Market Manipulation 
The reason for criminalizing conduct characterized as market manipulation was 
set out in the recitals of  Directive 2003/6/EC of  the European Parliament and the 
Council from 28 January 2003, as the need “to ensure the integrity of  Community financial 
41 Comissão de Mercado de Valores Mobiliários, Contra-Ordenações e Crimes no Mercado de Valores 
Mobiliários, July 2009, available at http://www.cmvm.pt/pt/EstatisticasEstudosEPublicacoes/
Estudos/EmArquivo/Documents/ContraOrdenacoeseCrimes199120091.pdf. 
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markets and to increase investor’s confidence in those markets. It is therefore advisable to adopt combined 
rules to combat both insider dealing and market manipulation to ensure the integrity of  Community 
financial markets and to enhance investor confidence in those markets. It is therefore advisable to adopt 
combined rules to combat both insider dealing and market manipulation”.42 
The Portuguese legal order had already established the crime of  fraudulent 
manipulation of  the market in the Code of  Commercial Companies of  1987 in article 
525, even before the adoption of  Directive 89/592/EC.43 Currently, Portuguese law 
prohibits dealing or informative behaviours that, by their nature or consequences, 
might be able to create delicate situations over a security or an issuer. More precisely, 
article 379 (1) of  the CdVM criminally prohibits the dissemination of  false, incomplete, 
exaggerated or biased information and the act of  carrying out fictitious transactions 
and performing other fraudulent practices. Behaviours which could artificially alter the 
normal functioning of  the securities markets or other financial instruments.
In addition to these forms of  manipulation, Portuguese law, from 1999, has 
provided for a specific crime that can occur within a financial intermediary: this crime 
can be committed by the members of  the board of  directors and those responsible for 
the management or supervision of  areas of  activity of  a financial intermediary who, 
having knowledge of  facts which constitute manipulation and which are performed by 
individuals directly subject to their supervision and in the exercise of  their duties, do 
not put an immediate end to such behaviour (article 379 (3) of  the CdVM).
The described facts can be committed if  the act is officially committed and also in 
the form of  a co-partnership as established in the Portuguese Criminal Code (Articles 
26 and 27). The attempt is not punished.
Certain acts are excluded from the scope of  prohibited behaviours, including: 
operations carried out by the European Central Bank, a State, its central bank or any other 
body designated by the State for reasons of  monetary policy, exchange rate or public 
debt management (article 379 (6) of  the CdVM); price stabilization operations, which 
are carried out under the legally permitted conditions (article 379 (6) of  the CdVM); 
market-making operations under the law (Article 348 of  the CdVM and Regulation 
3/2007 CMVM); accepted market practices, whose identification, dissemination and 
communication is made pursuant to article 360 (1) (i) of  the CdVM.
c) Applicable Penalties and Sanctions
Under Portuguese Law, insider dealing and market manipulation are punished 
with main and accessory penalties as well as with special juridical consequences, such 
as the loss of  the economic advantage obtained from the crime. According to article 
380 of  the CdVM, accessory penalties are the temporary inhibition (no longer than 
five years) of  the professional activity or an activity related to the crime and publication 
of  the sentence in places in which the objectives of  general prevention and market 
protection are achieved.
If  the illicit act generates economic benefits for the defendant or a third person 
for whom the defendant negotiated including interest, profit or other economic benefit, 
those amounts will be apprehended or declared lost in the final decision. 
42 Recital 12 of  the Directive 2003/6/EC of  the European Parliament and the Council from 28 
January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), OJ L 96, 12.4.2003, p. 
16–25. 
43 On the evolution of  the criminalisation of  market manipulation in Portugal see Claudia Verdial 
Pina, “Crime de manipulação do mercado: elementos típicos e recolha de prova”, Revista Julgar 17 (2012): 37. 
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If  the insider dealing agent is an administrator of  the company, or has access to 
the information due to their employment position, this is punishable with a maximum 
penalty of  imprisonment for 5 years or with a fine; if  the agent obtained the information 
through another means and negotiates or advises someone to negotiate in securities, 
the penalty is of  4 years of  imprisonment or a fine until 240 days. 
Under article 379 of  the CdVM, the penalties for market manipulation are of  
a maximum imprisonment of  5 years or a fine. Members of  the administrative body 
and the persons responsible for the general management or supervision of  areas of  
activity of  a financial intermediary who, being aware of  the conduct, performed by 
individuals directly subject to their management or supervision and exercising their 
duties, do not put them to an immediate end may be punished with imprisonment up 
to 4 years or fine of  up to 240 days if  more serious penalty is applicable under another 
legal provision.
However, this regime is not applicable to transactions carried out by the European 
Central Bank, a State, its central bank or any other body designated by the State for 
reasons of  monetary policy, exchange rate or public debt management or the operations 
of  stabilization of  prices, which are carried out under the legally permitted conditions.
The CMVM is the competent body for administrative offenses cases, with the 
authority to charge and decide. In these cases, preventive measures can be taken, such 
as the preventive suspension of  particular activities or functions performed by the 
defendant, apprehension or freezing of  values, or the imposition of  an information 
duty.  The administrative offenses can be very serious, serious our less serious. The 
fines applicable in each situation vary: for a very serious offense from 25 000€ to 
5.000.000€; for a serious offense from 12.500€ to 2.500.000€; for a less serious offense 
2.500€ to 500.000€.
In addition to the application of  a fine, under article 404 of  the CdVM, additional 
sanctions can be cumulatively applicable, such as the apprehension and loss of  the object 
of  the infraction, including the benefit obtained from the illegal behaviour; temporary 
ban from the exercise of  the profession or activity to which the offense relates; ban 
from the exercise of  management functions, control or supervision of  any financial 
intermediary within the market; withdrawal of  the authorization or cancelation of  
the necessary registration for the exercise of  market activities; and publication of  the 
sentence in places in which the objectives of  general prevention and market protection 
are achieved. 
The determination of  the applicable sanction – being a sanction or an accessory 
sanction – is regulated under article 405 of  the CdVM, done depending on the material 
illegality of  the act, the agent’s negligence, the benefits obtained from the behaviour and 
prevention requirements, also taking into account the natural or legal nature of  the agent.
The proceeds from pecuniary fines and seized benefits revert to the Investor 
Indemnity System (Sistema de Indemnização dos Investidores) and not the CMVM. 
d) Criminal Liability of  Legal Persons 
Both individuals and legal persons can be held liable for administrative offences, 
together or separately, depending on their participation in the acts (article 401 of  the 
CdVM). 
For the crime of  market manipulation and insider dealing, only individuals can 
be held liable and the agent must have acted with intent. For the crime of  market 
abuse and insider dealing, if  the agent who either practiced the crime or collaborated 
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in it is a legal person, then, under Portuguese law, legal persons cannot be held liable 
in a criminal case. The responsibility of  the legal person is excluded if  the agent acted 
against their order. Therefore, in such cases a legal person can be held liable in criminal 
proceedings as a civil party under the terms and for the purposes of  article 379 (5) 
of  the CdVM, in an attempt to repair the damage or return the profit obtained from 
the crime. In the cases of  administrative offenses there is no determination of  civil 
responsibility. However, this does not mean that repairing damage is not important in 
an administrative offense case, the reparation of  damages by the defendant is important 
to determine their responsibility.
V. The transposition of  the Directive – Law 28/2017 
The transposition of  the Market Abuse Directive constitutes the thirtieth 
amendment of  the Portuguese Securities Code. It entails the transposition of  Directive 
2013/50/EU of  the European Parliament and Council of  22 October 2013 amending 
Directive 2004/109/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council on the 
harmonisation of  transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers 
whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, Directive 2003/71/EC 
of  the European Parliament and of  the Council on the prospectus to be published 
when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and Commission 
Directive 2007/14/EC laying down detailed rules for the implementation of  certain 
provisions of  Directive 2004/109/EC; Commission Implementing Directive (EU) 
2015/2392, of  17 December 2015, on Regulation (EU) nº. 596/2014 of  the European 
Parliament and of  the Council as regards reporting to competent authorities of  actual 
or potential infringements of  that Regulation; and the adaptation of  the Portuguese law 
to Regulation (EU) nº. 596/2014. As stated above, both the Market Abuse Directive 
and Regulation 596/2014 consist of  a legislative double text package.
The new rules on market abuse update and strengthen the existing framework 
to ensure market integrity and investor protection. The Directive on Market Abuse 
complements the Market Abuse Regulation by requiring Member States to introduce 
criminal sanctions for the offences of  insider dealing and market manipulation where 
these are committed with intent, and to impose maximum criminal penalties of  not less 
than 4 and 2 years’ imprisonment for the most serious market abuse offences. 
The Market Abuse Regulation ensures regulation keeps abreast of  market 
developments such as the growth of  new trading platforms, over the counter (OTC) 
trading and new technology such as high frequency trading (HFT); strengthens the 
fight against market abuse across commodity and related derivative markets; explicitly 
bans the manipulation of  benchmarks; reinforces the investigative and administrative 
sanctioning powers of  regulators; and ensures a single rulebook while reducing, where 
possible, the administrative burdens on small and medium-sized enterprises issuers.
The main amendments to the Portuguese Securities Code were made in order to 
adapt Portuguese legislation to Regulation 596/2014. As far as the New Market Abuse 
Directive is concerned, no major amendments were made regarding the punishment 
of  the concerned acts. In fact, the New Market Abuse Directive obliges Member States 
to implement criminal sanctions in their legal order whose maximum limit should not 
be less than four years for insider trading and manipulation market and two years for 
the crime of  illegal transmission of  privileged information, limits which our CdVM 
already provided for. We note that there are a few examples of  omissions and incorrect 
transposition of  the Directive.
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a) Insider dealing
Article 3 (3) (a) of  the New Market Abuse Directive establishes that this article 
applies to any person who possesses inside information as a result of  being a member 
of  the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of  the issuer or emission allowance market 
participant. We analysed the wording of  the Portuguese, English, French, Spanish and 
Italian texts, and all of  them chose the word “member” to identify the subject (in 
Portuguese “membro”). Nevertheless, the Portuguese legislator, in the transposition of  
this provision into article 378 (1) (a) chose the word “titular” instead of  “membro”. Article 
378 (1) (a) reads as follows “due to his capacity as holder of  an administrative, management or 
supervisory body of  an issuer or of  a shareholder in its capital”. We understand that the wording 
chose by the Portuguese legislator for this article was unfortunate and may result in an 
incorrect interpretation and consequently application of  this provision. 
According to the previous regime, article 378 (2) already established the onward 
disclosure if  inside information as follows: any person who, having knowledge of  inside 
information, transmits the information to another person or, on the basis of  that information, negotiates 
or advises someone to trade in securities or other financial instruments or orders them to subscribe, sale, 
exchange, directly or indirectly, for themselves or another person, shall be punished with imprisonment 
up to 4 years or with a fine of  up to 240 days. With the transposition of  the New Market 
Abuse Directive, this article now includes the transmission of  information to amend or 
cancel an order concerning a financial instrument therefore transposing the provision 
of  article 3 (6) (b). 
The concept of  insider dealing contained in article 378 was expanded upon by 
the adoption of  paragraph 5 of  said article. So, according to article 378 (4) “insider 
information is all unpublished information which, being directly and indirectly accurate and related to 
any issuer or securities or other financial instruments, would be appropriate, if  it were made public, to 
influence market in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of  the European Parliament 
and of  the Council of  16 April 2014 and its regulations and delegated acts”; paragraph 5 of  
said article adds to that concept the “information on outstanding orders on securities or other 
financial instruments transmitted by clients of  financial intermediaries is also privileged, which is 
not public, is precise and directly or indirectly related to issuers or financial instruments, which, if  it 
were made public, would be capable of  appreciably influencing its price or the price of  spot commodity 
contracts”.  The Portuguese legislator introduced article 378 A which provides a specific 
regime on insider dealing on emission allowances.
b) Market Abuse
Regarding Market Abuse, the Portuguese legislator introduced three new articles 
regarding market manipulation besides the existing article 379. These are: articles 379 
A, B and C. Article 379 provides a general provision on market abuse. Articles A, B, C 
provide different specific regimes for emission allowances; spot commodities; and the 
manipulation of  the calculation of  a benchmark. 
Article 379 (1), transposing article 5 (2) (a) (i), now expressly provides not 
only a prohibition on the dissemination of  false, incomplete, exaggerated or biased 
information, but also misleading information. The penalty was not amended and therefore 
this crime is still punishable with a penalty of  five years imprisonment or a fine. The 
amendment to article 379 went further. The legislator included, in paragraph 2 of  
the article, an independent criminalization of  the artificial alteration of  the regular 
functioning of  the market punishable with a prison sentence of  up to 8 years or a fine 
of  up to 600 days.
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c) Criminal Liability of  Legal Persons 
Article 7 of  the New Directive on Market Abuse imposes an obligation on 
Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure that legal persons can be 
held liable for insider dealing and market abuse. However, this is not news for the 
Portuguese legal order. Since the adoption of  the Portuguese Penal Code of  1982, 
the criminal liability of  legal persons, especially in economic law, has been accepted. 
Article 11 prescribed that “unless otherwise specified, only natural persons criminally liable”. 
Article 401 of  the CdVM already provided that both individuals and legal persons can 
be held liable for administrative offences, together or separately, depending on their 
participation in the facts. 
VI. Concluding Remarks
It is evident that the Directive itself  did not entail a true reform of  the Portuguese 
legal order. The main amendments to the CdVM were made not because of  the 
Market Abuse Directive but because of  Regulation (EU) nº. 596/2014. However, the 
relevance of  this Directive must be analysed bearing in mind the importance of  the 
approximation of  national criminal policies within the EU regarding the prevention 
and effective punishment of  market abuse and insider dealing. In fact, prevention 
and punishment of  these crimes can only be achieved through the integration of  EU 
and national criminal policies. As we have already stated above, the approximation 
of  substantive criminal legislation is of  paramount importance as it aims not only at 
enhancing the fight against criminality and preventing criminals from benefiting from 
the existing disparities between Member States’ criminal laws; but it also ensures the 
development and exercise of  free movement of  persons within the EU and provides 
citizens with a common sense of  justice throughout the Union, creating a feeling of  
belonging to a common area.
